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the rate ceiling in § 334.011 on agricultural loans.
Consequently, the highest rate a "most favored
lender" state bank could charge pursuant to §
334.011 on agricultural loans would be no more
than 4.5% in excess of the federal discount rate.
John Joyce

DISPOSAL OF TOXIC CHEMICALS
HELD TO BE AN ABNORMALLY
DANGEROUS ACTIVITY
MANDATING STRICT LIABILITY
In T& EIndustries v. Safety Light Corp., 227 N.J.
Super. 228, 546 A.2d 570 (N.J. Super. 1988), a New
Jersey appellate court determined the scope of
the liability of a manufacturer who disposed of
hazardous waste on its former property. The
court found the former property owner strictly
liable to the successor in title who purchased the
property without knowledge of the danger. The
court held the resulting damages were proximately caused by the former owner and foreseeability was irrelevant. Further, the former
owner could not rely on the doctrine of caveat
emptor ("let the buyer beware") to avoid liability.
The United States Radium Corporation
("USRC") owned a plant in Orange, New Jersey.
Between 1917 and 1926, USRC extracted from
carnotite ore radium which was used for various
commercial purposes. The processing yielded a
solid waste known as "tailings" which were
dumped on vacant areas of the property. Both
radium and radium tailings are known carcinogens, posing a threat to human health.
In 1926, USRC closed its Orange plant site. The
plant remained vacant until it was leased to
commercial tenants in the mid-1930s. In 1943,
the property was purchased by one former
tenant. The purchaser was aware of the radium
deposits at the time of purchase but did not
regard the condition as dangerous. Consequently, the purchaser made an addition to the
plant over the area contaminated with radium
tailings. After a succession of owners, the site
was sold in 1974 to the plaintiff, T & E Industries
("T & E").
In March of 1979, the New Jersey Department
of Environmental Protection ("DEP") voiced
concern about the possibility of an excessive
level of radiation on T & E's property. Long-term
monitoring equipment revealed radium levels
sufficient to constitute a health risk. In response
to DEP's request for remedial action, T & E hired
a health physicist who implemented a variety of
safety measures. In addition, T & E conducted
independent testing which revealed that an

Editor's Note: On November 7,1988, the United
States Supreme Court denied the petition for
writ of certiorari. 57 U.S.L.W. 3333 (U.S. Nov. 7,
1988) (No. 88-591).

assembly area worker at the plant would be
exposed to the maximum statutory level of
radioactive material within 3.18 years. It became
clear that removing the contaminated soil under
and around the building was the only way to
render the building safe. When this measure was
rejected as too costly, T & E relocated to a new
facility.
T & Esued Safety Light Corporation and other
successor corporations of USRC for property
damages resulting from radium contamination.
The complaint alleged absolute liability, nuisance, negligence, misrepresentation and fraud.
T & E sought compensatory and punitive damages, as well as reimbursement for the cost of
decontaminating its property. USRC was charged
with originally dumping the radioactive waste
on the property.
The trial court granted T & E's pretrial motion
for partial summary judgment, holding that
USRC had in fact placed the radium tailings on T
& E's property. T & E proceeded to try its case
relying on the court's apparent decision that the
issue of absolute liability was decided in its favor.
However, after T & Epresented its evidence the
trial court granted USRC's motion to dismiss T &
E's absolute liability claims, contrary to its previous order. In addition, the trial court dismissed
T & E's claims of fraud, misrepresentation, reckless conduct, and punitive damages, leaving
only the negligence claim.
The court instructed the jury to determine,
among other things, whether USRC was negligent in its failure to warn T & E of a potential
health risk, and whether that negligence was a
proximate cause of T & E's damages. The jury
found that USRC had been negligent and that
this negligence had proximately caused T & E's
damages. However, the trial judge granted
USRC's motion to set aside the jury verdict on
the ground that the doctrine of caveat emptor
barred T & E's claim.
On appeal, the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Appellate Division, noted that "many of today's
problems due to toxic waste are a result of yesterday's mistakes... for which yesterday's perpetrators must be held responsible." 546 A.2d at
575. Of the five issues raised by T & Eon appeal,
the court addressed only the issue of absolute or
strict liability. Under traditional tort doctrines,
(continued on page 28)

TOXIC CHEMICALS (fr.M.M
the exercise of utmost care will not free one
from liability for damages resulting from an
abnormally dangerous activity. Section 520 of
the Second Restatement of Torts lists six factors
which determine whether an activity is abnormally dangerous:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some
harm to the person, land or chattels of another; (b) likelihood that the harm that results
from it will be great; (c) inability to eliminate
the risk by the exercise of reasonable care; (d)
extent to which the activity is not a matter of
common usage; (e) inappropriateness of the
activity to the place where it iscarried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community
is outweighed by its dangerous attributes.
3 Restatement, Torts 2d, § 520 at 36 (1976).
The appellate court determined that the handling and disposal of toxic waste is an "abnormally dangerous" activity and that the risk of
harm should not fall on the victim. Because
radium tailings are toxic waste, USRC's dumping
constituted an abnormally dangerous activity
for which it could be held strictly liable.
Next, the court considered USRC's knowledge of the health risks associated with radium,
noting that whether USRC had knowledge that
radium tailings were an abnormally dangerous
substance was relevant to a determination of
absolute liability. In a 1943 letter, USRC's president cited four incidents in which employees
had died from exposure to radium. Both the
letter and an informational pamphlet prepared
in part by USRC revealed the company's knowledge of the hazards of radioactive compounds.

Moreover, between 1917 and 1943, the plant employee who measured radon wore a lead-lined
apron and numerous signs warned employees
not to sharpen brushes of luminous paint with
their mouths, as this procedure was known to
cause cancer. Exposure to radiation had rendered one plant engineer sterile. When radon
became impacted under his fingernail, the company president voluntarily cut off his entire
finger.
The appellate court disagreed with the trial
court's conclusion that the doctrine of caveat
emptor barred T & E's suit. The appellate court
considered the doctrine outdated, widely abandoned and inapplicable. Because T & E did not
knowingly accept the radium-contaminated
property, the court refused to allow USRC to
escape liability by claiming that T & Ebought the
property at its own risk.
The court characterized USRC's conduct as a
"continuing tort" because the dangers associated with the decaying radium were continuous
even though the dumping had occurred many
years earlier. Because the law provides that liability for a continuing tort falls on the party originally responsible for the contamination, the
innocent successors in title who did not dump
radium tailings on the property did not share in
the liability. The appellate court noted that
" '[tihose who poison the land must pay for its
cure.' " 546 A.2d at 578, citing cases. The court
reversed the judgment in favor of USRC, directed the trial court to enter judgment on the
issue of liability in favor of T & E,and ordered a
new trial on the issue of damages.
Debbie Williams

ILLINOIS APPELLATE COURT
HOLDS COCA-COLA NOT
CAUSE OF ILLNESS SUFFERED
IMMEDIATELY AFTER
CONSUMPTION

Background
Warren purchased a can of Coca-Cola at Litt's
Cut Rate drug store. The can appeared clean and
the soft drink was carbonated as usual. Warren
took one large gulp of the soda, which tasted
terrible. Within five minutes she became ill.
Warren immediately went to a hospital where
her condition worsened. She informed the emergency room physician that she became sick after
consuming the cola. Consequently, he listed the
diagnosis on the emergency room report as
"acute gastritis" caused by ingestion of cocacola, and admitted her as a patient.
Warren remained in the hospital for six days
during which time she experienced stomach
cramps, diarrhea and vomiting. Her treating
physician failed to pinpoint the exact cause of
her illness. He advised her that the soft drink

In Warren v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 166 III.
App. 3d 566, 519 N.E.2d 1197 (111.
App. 1988), the
Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, held
that a plaintiff presented no genuine issue of
material fact to support her allegation that bacteria present in the soft drink she consumed
caused her illness. Consequently, the court affirmed the trial court's order granting summary
judgment in favor of defendants Coca-Cola
Company ("Coca-Cola") and Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Chicago ("the Bottling Company").

